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Abstract 
Existing studies of ethnic voting mainly focus on democratic elections. In electoral autocracies, 
politically subordinate ethnicity can help citizens coordinate against the incumbent. However, we 
argue that collective action will be constrained when the group grows large, as it becomes costly 
for its members to form common behavioural norms and carry out effective sanctions through 
shared ethnic ties under authoritarian repression. Drawing on unique historical surveys in 
Taiwan, we study how Taiwanese ethnicity and local ethnic demography jointly induced voters’ 
defection against the hegemonic KMT regime. We find that the pro-defection or anti-incumbent 
effect of Taiwanese ethnicity fell as the share of Taiwanese citizens in a township increased. 
However, the relative size of the Taiwanese group no longer undermined pro-defection ethnic 
voting after the KMT lifted the ban on opposition parties. Our results illustrate that formal 
organizations play a critical role in sustaining the informational salience of ethnicity in the 
elections. 
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* * * 
 
Ethnic voting in democratic elections has attracted considerable attention. Ethnicity can signal 
candidate quality, as well as the policy mandate of political parties, thus shaping vote choices 
and informing politicians’ strategic moves in the elections (Ferree, 2006; Birnir, 2007). By 
providing eligible individuals with a shared set of behavioural norms and sanction mechanisms 
against within-group defection, ethnicity can act as useful information heuristics for decision-
making while sustaining collective action (Hale, 2008).  
Drawing on recent studies (Eifert et al., 2010; Adida et al., 2017), we explore how 
ethnicity paves the foundation of popular resistance against the incumbent ruler in multi-group 
electoral autocracies, as well as the conditions under which ethnicity becomes politically salient. 
When ethnic divisions coincide with the power asymmetry between the dictator and his subjects, 
shared ethnic ties can help citizens and opposition forces from the politically dominated group 
coordinate against the autocratic incumbent in partially competitive elections. Since non-
democratic rulers usually impose extensive restrictions on civil liberties, citizens under 
authoritarian rule can usually only rely on shared ethnicity for decision-making and social 
interactions. 
Nonetheless, we contend that the visibility of group differences alone cannot sustain the 
salience of ethnicity for collective resistance. More specifically, we argue that the efficiency of 
an ethnicity as an information shortcut is likely to decline as its relative size grows large in the 
local community. As a group’s relative size increases, individuals are less likely to note 
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intergroup distinction and are more likely to resort to other attributes for decision-making. While 
this issue can be present in both democratic and authoritarian regimes, we posit that politically 
dominated ethnic groups face an even more acute challenge in this regard. These groups are 
likely to be the target of autocratic repression that seeks to undermine any potential group-based 
mobilization that can take place either through traditional social groups or modern political 
organizations.  
As a result, we argue that ethnicity in authoritarian regimes can best act as an informal 
device for individuals’ spontaneous actions that allow individuals to defy the dictator’s rule as a 
group. Without effective organizational support, the mobilizing capacity of ethnicity is prone to 
the common pitfalls of effective collective action in large groups (Olson, 1965). While ethnicity 
can be considered as an ‘institution’ by providing individuals with the foundation of social order 
and informs differences in preferences, information and beliefs for interpersonal transactions and 
group-based political endeavours, ethnicity will cease to serve as an effective coordination and 
sanction device in large groups as it is hard to secure the agreed sets of shared “preferences, 
information, and beliefs” in an informal setting. 
We focus on the case of post-war Taiwan. In 1949, as the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) of claimed its victory in the Chinese Civil War, Chiang Kai-shek relocated his 
Kuomintang (KMT) government to Taiwan and introduced martial law. In the next four decades, 
the KMT government imposed various restrictions on press freedom and civil liberties in 
Taiwan. The KMT’s hegemonic rule also led to the political dominance of the Mainlanders – 
who resettled in Taiwan from mainland China following Japanese colonial rule (1895-1945) – 
over the Taiwanese, who are largely the descendants of the Han migrants in the late 19th 
century.1 In 1969, the KMT called for the legislative by-election for the Legislative Yuan, the 
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nominal national legislature, for the first time since 1948. The by-elections offered local 
Taiwanese elites a political platform at the national level to challenge the hegemonic regime. 
Despite the obstacles imposed by the KMT, Taiwanese politicians managed to establish various 
associations that led to the creation of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 1986. In 1992, 
nearly four decades after the 1949 relocation, the KMT government held the first multiparty 
election.  
We analyse two unique historical surveys that document the vote choices of more than 
1,000 Taiwanese citizens in the 1983 and 1992 legislative elections. The survey for the 1983 
election was the first to construct a representative sample of the entire voting population. The 
survey was also important because it focused on the last single-party national election before the 
KMT lifted martial law in 1987. In brief, while Taiwanese ethnicity is positively associated with 
voters’ defection against the KMT, we find such pro-defection or anti-incumbent effect declines 
as the Taiwanese proportion of a township’s local population increased. Furthermore, the anti-
autocrat effect of Taiwanese ethnicity is no longer associated with the relative size of Taiwanese 
group in a township in the 1992 election, suggesting that ethnicity can overcome the collective 
action dilemma as the opposition managed to build a formal organization. 
Our article combines the literatures on ethnic voting and electoral authoritarianism. 
Responding to the call for more research on voting behaviour in non-democratic elections 
(Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009), we show ethnicity can induce voter defection against the 
incumbent in an environment with highly restricted information. Furthermore, by showing how 
the anti-incumbent effect of a politically dominated ethnicity can be constrained by local ethnic 
demography, we demonstrate that without a solid organizational foundation, ethnicity could only 
trigger voter defection at a much smaller scale in a spontaneous manner. Our findings, in this 
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vein, may seem counterintuitive for those familiar with the literature on ethnic politics in 
democracies (e.g., Posner 2004), as we have shown how relative group size can undermine 
ethnic mobilization. Finally, our study extends the literature on the politics of post-war Taiwan. 
While existing studies mostly focus on elections after the democratic transition (Wu and Hsiao, 
2006; Cheng, 2009), we trace the root of ethnic voting among Taiwanese voters as the means to 
combat hegemonic rule back to the martial law period. 
 
Pro-Defection EthnicVoting in Authoritarian Elections 
In this section, we present our theoretical argument and testable implications. We start by 
highlighting that ethnicity can act as a crucial information shortcut permitting cooperation and 
coordination within politically dominated groups in both democratic and authoritarian elections. 
We then explain how relative group size can undermine the efficiency of shared ethnic ties for 
collective action and why relative group size is more likely to constrain the mobilization of 
subordinate groups in ethnically diverse authoritarian regimes. 
To begin with, existing studies of ethnic voting have mostly focused on democratic 
elections dictated by ethnic divisions (Ferree, 2006; Birnir, 2007; Horowitz and Long, 2016; 
Adida et al., 2017). Ethnicity allows individuals of the same ethnicity to coordinate their beliefs 
about the strategy set and chosen actions of each other. In elections, ethnicity thus signals not 
only candidate quality but also the policy mandate of different parties, both of which in turn 
shape voters’ choices while informing politicians of their political alignment and campaign 
strategies.  
As in democratic countries, we argue that ethnic cleavages can signal shared desirable 
goals among individuals of the same ethnicity in autocracies. Ethnicity establishes the expected 
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norms of interactions among co-ethnic individuals, as well as between individuals from different 
groups, setting the boundary of conformity and sanctioning deviations. With various restrictions 
on civil liberties, autocrats seek to control the flow of information and ideas, putting citizens in 
an opaque information environment. In doing so, the autocrat gains the leverage to increase the 
cost of anti-regime mobilization as he isolates his subjects from each other. When ethnic 
cleavages coincide with the power asymmetry between the dictator and his subjects, the latter 
can resort to co-ethnic ties to assess the viability of different political actions and collaborate to 
defend their group interests. Although dictators often curtail or even repress the salience of 
ethnic divisions, ethnically based mobilization has sustained popular struggle against 
dictatorships or played a crucial role in driving democratic transitions. In the former Soviet 
Union, ethnicity also facilitated electoral mobilization and mass protests that led to regime 
transition in the 1980s (Roeder, 1991; Beissinger, 2002; Finkel, 2015). 
However, the political salience of ethnicity is conditional. Since ethnicity is a 
multidimensional social construct encompassing various identity ‘categories’, such as religion, 
language, place of origin and tribal affiliation, researchers have developed two avenues of 
research. As individuals possess their own ‘identity repertoire’ (Posner, 2017), which includes a 
broad range of identity attributes, it remains to be answered whether a particular attribute or a 
subset of it provides the basis of decision-making and collective action under different political 
and socioeconomic contexts. The literature on constitutional design highlights the impact of 
institutions on politicizing social cleavages and exacerbating existing conflicts (Cederman et al., 
2010; Eifert et al., 2010). Others explore economic factors of intergroup perceptions and group-
based mobilization (Cederman et al., 2011; Huber and Suryanarayankas, 2016). Finally, studies 
of civil wars show how local ethnic demography can influence the political relevance of group 
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divisions. For instance, Kimuli Kasara (2017) shows that segregation will create a security 
dilemma between different groups by hindering inter-group communication and increasing 
distrust. 
Focusing on a single case (post-war Taiwan), we have held the institutional context 
constant. Doing so also allows us to treat the economic relations as given -- the divide between 
the Taiwanese and Mainlanders coincided with the economic gap between these two ethnic blocs 
(Gates 1981; Yang 2011). In line with the last research avenue, we posit that community-level 
ethnic composition plays a crucial role in shaping individuals’ informational consideration 
related to their ethnicity. We propose that the political salience will decline as the relative group 
size grows. First, as the number of individuals that can fall into a particular ethnicity increases, 
individuals will have to consider more potential variation when formulating and processing the 
norms and expectations shared among their co-ethnic members, requiring greater effort to 
maintain group boundaries. Citizens in dictatorships will face more difficulty because dictators 
impose strict surveillance to inhibit coordination among their subjects. Second, individuals’ 
share of symbolic and material utilities tied to ethnicity will be diluted as the group’s relative 
size increases, rendering co-ethnic ties less attractive as a shortcut for information processing and 
decision-making (Posner, 2017). Third, when a single group accounts for the majority in the 
community, it will also be more difficult for individuals to formulate their understandings of 
group contrast as they are less likely to encounter those from other groups. Under such 
circumstances, individuals will have the incentive to resort to other heuristics or even establish 
subgroups under a given ethnicity. Mancur Olson (1965) compares the dynamics of collective 
action in large and small groups. Compared to small groups, large groups require additional 
inducement or measures, which are often coercive and formal, to enforce individuals’ 
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contribution to the production of collective goods. Large groups, meanwhile, often face a greater 
cost of coordination than small groups do and thus suffer from the under-supply of public goods.  
While the same constraint is present regardless of regime types, we argue that politically 
dominated groups under authoritarian rule are more likely to suffer than those in democracies. 
Collective action in a large group often requires a formal organization to settle any internal 
disagreements. Since civic organizations, including those based on ethnicity, are subject to either 
crackdown or extensive scrutiny in authoritarian regimes, ethnicity can only serve as an informal 
institution that signals the package of shared norms and behaviour expectations. While informal 
institutions, like their formal counterparts, help to reduce the challenge of information 
asymmetry and transaction costs between individuals and facilitate collective action, they lack 
credible enforcement mechanisms. Decision-making based on ethnicity in autocracies involves 
an extra hurdle on individuals to account for potential defections and a large margin of errors by 
themselves. 
As a result, in an authoritarian regime, the capacity of ethnicity as the driving force of 
collective resistance, such as voting for opposition candidates in authoritarian elections, is 
limited. While ethnicity can induce coordination and mobilize voters from the same group, 
ethnically based resistance can be subject to the usual pitfalls of collective action in large groups. 
In contrast, democratic political parties tackle the weakness of ethnicity as an institution of 
collective action. A political party can be more efficient than informal group associations to 
aggregate different preferences and interests with formal membership and grassroots 
organizations (Panebianco, 1988). First, the formal membership provides a credible public signal 
by incorporating ethnicity to inform actors, including both politicians and voters, of mutually 
acceptable political objectives and a credible sanction platform to induce long-term commitment 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3918313
9 
 
against deviations. Next, compared with informal associations, political parties can also develop 
or connect existing local apparatus to coordinate politicians and reach out to voters across 
different constituencies under a single brand (Cox and McCubbins, 1993; Aldrich, 1995). 
Existing studies have also shown the importance of political parties in sustaining identity-based 
political mobilization. In India, Kanchan Chandra (2004) and others have studied how ethnic 
parties can mobilize the votes of lower caste communities and other historically marginalized 
social groups. Dawn Brancati (2009) argues that the presence of regional parties determines 
whether decentralization will encourage secession movements and endanger state integrity. In 
both cases, political parties provide a domain that bolsters the institutional value of ethnicity for 
credible transactions between individuals. 
To sum up, while ethnicity helps to facilitate and sustain resistance against the autocratic 
incumbent among the politically dominated group, we argue that its efficiency can be 
constrained by local ethnic demography. In other words, the political salience or relevance of 
ethnicity depends on not only the visibility of ethnic differences but also the presence of formal 
organizational support.2 
Empirically, Taiwanese ethnicity should help the subordinate Taiwanese voters overcome 
the information disadvantage imposed by the hegemonic rule and spontaneously coordinate their 
defection, although the pro-defection or anti-incumbent effect of Taiwanese ethnic is limited. We 
expect the relative group size would no longer serve as the constraint on anti-incumbent ethnic 
voting after the KMT government lifted martial law. That is, compared with the 1983 election, 
the relative group size should not undermine the pro-opposition effect of Taiwanese ethnicity in 
the 1992 multiparty election. 
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Hypothesis 1. Taiwanese voters are more likely to defect against the autocratic incumbent in 
authoritarian elections. 
 
Hypothesis 2. The pro-defection effect of Taiwanese ethnicity decreases as the relative size of 
the Taiwanese group in the local community increases. 
 
Hypothesis 3. The relative group size in the local community does not undermine the pro-
defection effect of Taiwanese ethnicity with the presence of an opposition party. 
 
National Legislative Elections in Post-War Taiwan 
In 1949, as the CCP seized control over mainland China, Chiang Kai-shek relocated the KMT 
government to Taiwan and introduced martial law to hold out against the CCP. Martial law 
granted Chiang and the KMT supreme authority above the democratic constitution. In the 
absence of effective checks and balance, the KMT regime imposed extensive restrictions on civil 
rights in Taiwan. Soon afterwards, Chiang suspended all national elections and banned the 
formation of new political parties. 
As a result, the Legislative Yuan – the national legislative body – became the ‘rubber 
stamp’ of the hegemonic KMT regime (Copper and Chen, 1984). It was not until 1969 that the 
KMT announced the plan to organize the first ‘supplementary’ election for the national 
parliament. Previous research has offered two reasons behind Chiang’s decision to hold the 
election. First, the KMT wanted to fill the seats vacated by the deaths of elderly legislators, most 
of whom were elected in mainland China.3 Since only a subset of seats was open for 
contestation, the proposed legislative election was essentially a by-election. Secondly, broadly 
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speaking, the KMT in the 1960s faced a series of diplomatic setbacks that jeopardized Chiang’s 
leverage to represent himself as the leader of the only legitimate “democratic” China in the world 
(Chao, 1996).4 Chiang sought to distinguish his Taiwan-based KMT regime from the CCP in the 
Mainland by holding a national election. Following the 1969 election, the KMT continued to 
hold supplementary elections every three years. 
Like other electoral autocracies, the KMT also attempted to constrain the presence of 
non-KMT candidates through various means. For instance, non-KMT candidates were often 
arbitrarily removed from the elections. As in local elections, the KMT also engaged in 
clientelistic vote buying and election fraud (Wang, 1997). More crucially, given that the 
formation of new political parties remained outlawed, non-KMT politicians could only contest as 
independent candidates. Meanwhile, these elections adopted the single non-transferable voting 
(SNTV) system, which is known for providing a relatively lower winning threshold than the 
plurality system (Lijphart, 1999). With a greater chance of winning a seat in multi-member 
districts, the SNTV system created an additional barrier for the opposition to organize and 
coordinate (Cheng, 1989).  
Despite all the obstacles, the KMT’s decision to hold the supplementary elections was 
still a critical watershed. For one thing, these elections, although rigged, offered Taiwanese 
politicians a platform to partake in politics at the national level. By the late 1970s, they managed 
to join together to voice their discontent against Chiang and his hegemonic KMT regime, as well 
as the disproportionate dominance of the Mainlanders, who only accounted for the minority of 
the total population.5 With Mainlanders taking most leading government posts, non-KMT 
politicians began to incorporate the pursuit of ethnic empowerment into their request for 
democracy (Hsieh, 2003). 
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In the late 1970s, non-KMT politicians began to create pre-electoral alliances to 
coordinate candidate nominations and campaign strategies among themselves (Huang, 1992). 
While these alliances were mostly temporary, in September 1983, several non-KMT politicians 
created a writers’ association, ‘tangwai’ (meaning ‘outside the party’, namely the KMT), in 
Taipei Municipality. While John Copper and George Chen (1984) consider tangwai as a political 
party, it is important to note that non-KMT politicians could only coordinate as independent 
candidates in the elections. Moreover, they were not able to recruit formal party members to 
build efficient mobilization machines at the grassroots level. Three years later, defying the 
KMT’s ban on new parties, tangwai politicians announced the formation of the Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP) in September 1986 to officially contest the KMT’s hegemonic rule in 
Taiwan. In the end, the KMT government did not take any action against the DPP and suspended 
martial law the following year.6 In 1992, the KMT government held the first multiparty 
legislative election since 1948. As shown in Figure 1, the presence of non-KMT legislators in the 
Legislative Yuan remained limited throughout the martial law period; that said, the number of 
seats open for contestation slightly increased. 
 




Figure 1: Party composition of elected Legislative Yuan members, 1969-1992. 
 
Empirical Analysis 
Our analysis draws on two unique surveys conducted by researchers from the National Taiwan 
University (NTU) following the 1983  and 1992 elections (hereafter ‘1983 survey’ and ‘1992 
survey’). The 1983 survey was the very first one that sought to study the citizens’ vote choices 
under martial law, based on a representative sample in Taiwan. The NTU researchers collected 
more than 1,000 responses from six counties, each of which was randomly selected from a 
constituency. Two townships were then randomly chosen from each county. 
The 1992 survey includes similar questions to the 1983 survey, thus providing us with the 
opportunity to compare voters’ preferences (or intentions) before and after the lifting of martial 
law. Following a similar sampling scheme, the NTU team created the study sample from ten 
counties. It is important to stress that the sample is representative only with respect to the voting 
population in the election. The changes in the number of sampled counties reflected the results of 
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redistricting in the 1992 election.7 Figure A1 in the Online Appendix shows the locations of 
sampled townships in each survey. 
In the following analysis, we have decided to exclude all responses from Taipei 
Municipality because the 1983 survey did not specify the districts (as it did for townships in the 
counties) from which the sample was collected.8 Later, we will include responses from Taipei 
Municipality in one of our robustness checks and discuss how our results are influenced by their 
inclusion in the analysis. We present the summary statistics of our main variables in the Online 
Appendix (Tables A1 and A2). 
 
Explanatory Variable 
The explanatory variable is a binary indicator that takes the value of 1 if a respondent is of 
Taiwanese ethnicity, which refers to the descendants of the Han people who migrated from 
mainland China before Japanese colonial rule (1895-1945).9 To be specific, Taiwanese ethnicity 
includes two groups: Hoklo and Hakka, both of which could trace their ancestors back to Fujian 
and Guangdong in the Mainland. In addition to these two groups, one can also find indigenous 
peoples in Taiwan. According to existing archaeological evidence, these peoples had moved to 
Taiwan from different Pacific islands long before the Han Chinese’s arrival in the 17th century. 
Finally, Mainlanders refers to the Han Chinese migrants that arrived in Taiwan after WWII, as 
well as their descendants. Figure A3 in the Online Appendix shows the ethnic composition of the 
study sample in each survey. 
Under the KMT’s hegemonic rule, Hoklo and Hakka were both politically dominated by 
the Mainlanders. In line with previous studies, we have decided to focus on the Hoklo people, 
who were relatively outspoken against the KMT regime, in the following analysis (Sheng, 1986). 
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For one thing, while the Hakka people have maintained a unique group identity, it was not until 
the post-martial law era that they became politically active (Wang, 2005). Also, the Hoklo group 
accounts for a greater portion among the local Taiwanese than the Hakka group. Since the 
surveys adopted multilevel sampling to create representative samples, they only included a small 
number of Hakka and indigenous respondents.10 The robustness test shows that our findings do 
not depend on the decision to exclude these groups. 
All survey respondents were asked to provide the ethnicity of their parents. Again, 
following previous studies, we define each respondent’s ethnicity based on the father’s ethnicity 
(Sheng, 1986). In other words, a respondent is considered of Taiwanese ethnicity if his or her 
father is of the same ethnicity. Nevertheless, we recode our variable by defining respondents as 
Taiwanese only if both of their parents are Taiwanese. Since more than 90 per cent of 




Using each respondent’s claimed vote choice, we create a binary indicator that takes the value of 
1 if respondents declared that they did not vote for the KMT in the elections. In other words, the 
dependent variable indicates whether a voter is willing to express openly their disobedience. 
To recap, in 1983, all non-KMT politicians had to contest as independent candidates 
unless they were nominated by the Young China Party (YCP) and the China Democratic 
Socialist Party (CDSP), both of which were created in the Mainland before 1949 and became 
symbolic opposition forces following the introduction of martial law.11 In the 1983 survey, 
nearly ten per cent of the study population reported that they did not vote. Among those who 
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voted, about a fifth did not share their voting decisions. About 200 respondents reported that they 
voted for opposition candidates. No one indicated that they voted for the YCP or CDSP. In the 
1992 survey, about 13 per cent of the study population reported that they did not vote. Among 
those who voted (about 1,200 participants), about 200 respondents either declined to report their 
vote choices or could not recall the candidates they supported. 262 and 640 respondents reported 
that they voted for the DPP and KMT, respectively. Figure A2 in the Online Appendix shows the 
vote choices of survey respondents. Figure 2 shows the survey respondents’ choices by ethnicity, 
and Taiwanese voters were consistently more likely to defect than Mainlanders. For instance, for 
the 1983 election, more than 50 per cent of Taiwanese respondents declined to support the KMT, 
whereas only about 20 per cent of the Mainlanders did so. 
Before we proceed, a caveat is warranted. As in other studies of electoral authoritarian 
regimes, one may question whether the survey can validly capture the voters’ preferences, as the 
citizens were likely to conceal their true preferences. For the reason we have just highlighted, we 
have thus decided to focus on voter defection rather than the support for the opposition. The 
outcome variable of interest acts to indicate a relatively extreme case such that a respondent was 
willing to turn his or her back on the hegemonic party. Nonetheless, to be noted, Chiang Ching-
kuo, who succeeded his father Chiang Kai-shek in 1975, introduced a series of reforms to 
increase political participation and contestation in the 1980s. The risks involved in voting for the 
opposition or declining to support the KMT thus had decreased significantly compared with the 
1970s.  
 




Figure 2: Voter defection by ethnicity: 1983 Survey (left) and 1992 Survey (right). 
 
Ethnic Demography 
We include the Taiwanese group’s share in the population of each sampled township to test how 
local ethnic demography can moderate the pro-defection effect of Taiwanese ethnicity. As 
hypothesized, since Chiang and the KMT outlawed the formation of opposition parties, large 
group size can undermine the efficiency of ethnicity as an informal institution of collective 
action. For the 1983 election, we use the last available official data on ethnic composition from 
the 1980 census. For the 1992 election, we use the 1990 census data. 
 
Control Variables 
We have considered other factors that can also explain individual respondents’ claimed vote 
choices. First, previous studies on non-democratic countries have highlighted the importance of 
censored media in driving subjects’ approval towards or grievances against the regime (Geddes 
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mass media in Taiwan remained strictly censored. It is likely that frequent media consumption 
will induce individuals’ support towards candidates from the hegemonic party or deter voters 
from expressing their support for the opposition. Both surveys included a set of questions that 
indicated how often each respondent watches television, listens to the radio, and reads 
newspapers. We recode respondents as 1 (otherwise 0) if they answered ‘usually,’ which was the 
highest among all possible ordinal options. We include each respondent’s educational 
background. The surveys asked each respondent to report their highest level of education from 
nine categories, ranging from ‘illiterate’ to ‘post-graduate.’ We create an ordinal variable with 
higher values indicating more education a respondent received.12 
We also control for two variables that indicate individuals’ ties with the hegemonic 
regime. First, we include a binary variable that becomes 1 if a respondent was a KMT member. 
Being a KMT member is perhaps the most clear-cut indicator to suggest whether an individual 
was co-opted by the hegemonic party, thus having the incentive to support its candidates. In the 
sample of the 1983 survey, around a quarter of respondents were reported to be official KMT 
members. In the sample for the 1992 election, the percentage of KMT members fell to about 
20%. Second, we control for whether a respondent was a public employee, which included all 
respondents that chose ‘military,’ ‘government staff’ and ‘teachers for primary and secondary 
schools’ as their occupations. In hegemonic party regimes (Magaloni, 2006), citizens in these 
occupations are usually the dominant party’s core supporters, with the various symbolic and 
materials benefits to the jobs in the public sector. In both surveys, public employees account for 
about ten per cent of the study population. 
Moreover, we include three demographic and socioeconomic variables that can influence 
individuals’ attitudes toward the KMT regime. First, we include a dummy variable to indicate 
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male respondents. We also control for each respondent’s age, which was measured by nine 
ordinal categories in the survey. We then control for household income, which ranges from 1 to 4 
with the value of 4 indicating the richest households.  
 
Conditional Pro-Defection Effect of Taiwanese Ethnicity 
In Table 1, we present our main findings based on the linear probability model.13 In Section A4 
in the Online Appendix we explain our model choice and specification. The first four models are 
based on the 1983 survey. The remaining four models are based on the 1992 survey. We first 
include Taiwanese ethnicity, add its interaction with the share of Taiwanese group in the 
township, and then include all control variables.14 In addition to the explanatory and control 
variables, we have also included county fixed effects in the analysis to account for various 
location-specific factors, such as the degree of urbanization -- some suggest that rural voters are 
most prone to the KMT’s clientelistic mobilization (Wu, 1987), the number of competing local 
political factions, the number of candidates in the elections, and the ethnic composition of 
candidates.15 
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Table 1: Estimates of voter defection. 
 1983 election 1992 election 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Taiwanese (= 1) 0.255*** 0.224*** 0.104** 0.071* 0.286*** 0.248*** 0.212*** 0.189*** 
 (0.054) (0.049) (0.044) (0.041) (0.048) (0.059) (0.050) (0.057) 
Share of Taiwanese group  0.038*  0.031  0.048  0.024 
  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.030)  (0.028) 
Taiwanese x Share of Taiwanese  -0.074***  -0.079***  -0.052  -0.036 
  (0.023)  (0.020)  (0.037)  (0.034) 
Media use (= 1)   -0.170*** -0.169***   -0.109** -0.107** 
   (0.041) (0.040)   (0.043) (0.043) 
Education   -0.015 -0.016   -0.003 -0.004 
   (0.011) (0.012)   (0.013) (0.013) 
KMT member (= 1)   -0.207*** -0.206***   -0.213*** -0.212*** 
   (0.041) (0.039)   (0.041) (0.042) 
Public employee (= 1)   0.035 0.038   -0.004 -0.004 
   (0.082) (0.081)   (0.037) (0.036) 
Household income   -0.050** -0.048**   -0.016 -0.015 
   (0.023) (0.022)   (0.022) (0.022) 
Age   -0.020** -0.020**   -0.011 -0.011 
   (0.008) (0.008)   (0.007) (0.007) 
Male (= 1)   0.090*** 0.092***   0.088*** 0.088*** 
   (0.021) (0.021)   (0.031) (0.031) 
Observations 1,392 1,392 1,335 1,335 1,003 1,003 1,001 1,001 
Adjusted R2 0.031 0.032 0.097 0.099 0.068 0.068 0.106 0.105 
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
 
 
For both elections, the Taiwanese coefficients are constantly positive and statistically 
significant. In other words, before and after the lifting of martial law, Taiwanese ethnicity is 
associated with voters’ defection against the hegemonic party. Compared with their 1983 
counterparts, the estimated marginal coefficients of Taiwanese ethnicity are greater in the case of 
the 1992 election. This finding aligns with our conjecture that highlights the importance of 
formal political organization in bolstering the anti-autocrat effect of Taiwanese ethnicity. In the 
same table, the estimated coefficients of the interaction term are negative for both elections, 
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suggesting that the pro-defection effect of Taiwanese ethnicity declines as the relative size of the 
Taiwanese group grew large in the township. However, they are only statistically significant for 
the 1983 election.  
Overall, we observe a consistent anti-incumbent effect of Taiwanese ethnicity in both 
elections. Nevertheless, its pro-defection effect has appeared to be undermined by the relative 
group size under the KMT’s hegemonic rule, as we have proposed above. Following the lifting 
of the ban on opposition parties, we find that the relative group size no longer serves as a 
constraint. Figure 3 shows the estimated effect of Taiwanese ethnicity, conditional on the share 
of the Taiwanese group in the township. Only in the 1983 survey did the pro-defection impact of 
Taiwanese ethnicity decline as the share of Taiwanese in the township grew. 
 
  
Figure 3: Conditional anti-incumbent effect of Taiwanese ethnicity: 1983 Survey and 1992 
Survey. Error bars show the 95% confidence intervals. 
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We conduct several tests to evaluate the robustness of our main findings (Section A5 in 
the Online Appendix). Two tests are worth particular attention. First, when we include Taipei 
Municipality, the interaction term’s estimated coefficient for the 1983 election is no longer 
statistically significant. In addition to the data constraint mentioned above, this result is in fact 
consistent without overall argument, as Taipei Municipality was the only place where non-KMT 
politicians coordinated to create an organized alliance prior to the 1983 election. Second, one of 
the robustness tests considers the nonlinear effect of local ethnic demography, and the estimated 
coefficient of the squared Share of Taiwanese is statistically insignificant. This result is 
consistent with our argument that the visibility of group differences alone does not sustain the 
political salience of ethnic ties. 
Our control variables also exhibit interesting patterns. For both elections, Media use is 
negatively correlated with voter defection, although the size of estimated coefficients decreased 
for the 1992 election. The estimated coefficients of Media use may suggest that the lasting and 
yet decreasing impact of media censorship imposed by the hegemonic party. Next, being a KMT 
member is negatively correlated with voter defection, perhaps unsurprisingly. Finally, we find 
that male voters were more likely to defect from supporting the KMT in the 1983 election under 
the Martial Law.16 
Next, we consider the correlates of non-responses. In many democratic and authoritarian 
elections, voters often express their grievances against the incumbent implicitly by declining to 
express their opinions (Shi, 1999; Cohen, 2018). We also explore the correlates of negative 
attitudes towards the quality of elections. The dependent variables are two binary indicators that 
take the value of 1 if the respondent did not vote (or declined to report their vote choices) and 
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perceived elections as fraught with rigging, respectively. We expect both dependent variables 
will similarly signal citizens’ resentment towards the hegemonic party. 
Figures 4 and 5 demonstrate how Taiwanese ethnicity, conditional on local ethnic 
democracy, influences the occurrence of non-responses as well as the voters’ perception of the 
quality of elections (the full regression tables are available in the Online Appendix). First, while 
Taiwanese ethnicity is positively associated with non-response in the authoritarian election (the 
1983 election), we also find that Taiwanese voters are more likely than their Mainlander peers to 
consider that elections might be rigged. Next, we also find a similar pattern that shows how local 
ethnic demography can moderate the anti-incumbent effect of Taiwanese ethnicity in the 1983 
election. As the proportion of the Taiwanese group increases in the townships, Taiwanese voters 





Figure 4: Non-responses: 1983 Survey and 1992 Survey. Error bars show the 95% confidence 
intervals. 









































































Figure 5: Perceived electoral fraud: 1983 Survey and 1992 Survey. Error bars show the 95% 
confidence intervals. 
 
Organized Opposition and Pro-defection Ethnic Voting 
We now test whether the presence of an organized opposition force indeed overcomes the 
constraints of ethnicity as an informal driver for collective action. Full regression tables are 
available in the Online Appendix. We have retrieved historical records that document the date on 
which the DPP established its local branches across different municipalities and counties. As 
indicated by the DPP, it requires at least 200 members to build a local branch at the county level 
(Huang, 1992). These local branches play a critical role in recruiting members for the party and 
organizing mass rallies during the elections (Fan, 1994). We use the timing of each local office’s 
establishment to indicate the variation in the strength of the DPP’s grassroots party machine.17 
We divide respondents by county -- counties in which a DDP local office was established 
within a year following its formal creation in 1986, or by the official lifting of martial law in 
1987, and those that had to wait more than one year to achieve such a position. We have decided 
to use the end of martial law as the cut-off, as it would require extra effort at the grassroots level 
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when the official ban on the formation of new parties remained in place. If the DPP fosters anti-
incumbent ethnic voting among Taiwanese voters, we should only see the decline in the pro-
defection effect of Taiwanese ethnicity in counties where it took the DPP additional time to build 
its grassroots presence. 
The results in Figure 6 are consistent with our expectations. In counties where the DPP 
was able to build regular bases during martial law, Share of Taiwanese does not undermine the 
pro-defection effect of Taiwanese (top panel of Figure 6). In counties where local branches 
appeared late (bottom panel of Figure 6), the share of the Taiwanese group in the township still 
hindered the anti-incumbent effect of Taiwanese ethnicity, as the coefficients of the interaction 
term are negative and significant. Compared with the results in Table 1, we observe a larger 
negative interaction for counties where the DPP appeared to struggle to build a formal base. In 
other words, the absence of local opposition organizations makes it more difficult for Taiwanese 
ethnicity to facilitate ethnic voting against the hegemonic party. 
Nonetheless, the top panel of Figure 6 also suggests that the grassroots party 
organizations were unable to mobilize the Taiwanese voters in the early 1990s, as we would 
observe a significant, positive interaction in that case. This finding may be unsurprising because, 
as indicated by Huang (1992), the KMT regime remained dominant in the 1990s, and it was not 
until 2000 that Taiwan saw the first switch of the ruling party. However, considering that the 
DPP started grassroots party building in the urban areas, the opposition party was still 
moderately successful in terms of countering the challenge of ethnic voting in a large group. 
 
 




Figure 6: DPP local branches and pro-defection ethnic voting: Branches Before and After 
Martial Law. 
 
Conversely, we consider the effect of Taiwanese ethnicity conditional on the hegemonic 
party’s local presence. We have retrieved the results of the 1990 township elections and divide 
up the respondents based on whether the KMT was able to garner more than 50 per cent of the 
popular votes. As shown by Figure 7, we find that Share of Taiwanese was only negatively 
associated with Taiwanese ethnicity’s anti-incumbent effect when the KMT was politically 
dominant at the grassroots level. 
 






























































Figure 7: KMT’s vote share and pro-defection ethnic voting: ≥ 50% and < 50%. 
 
Conclusion 
Drawing on unique historical surveys in Taiwan, we show that subordinate or politically 
dominated ethnicity can drive voter defection against the incumbent autocrat. While shared 
ethnic ties indeed can induce coordination among voters and the opposition, the effectiveness of 
ethnicity for political mobilization remains constrained in the absence of organized opposition 
forces in electoral authoritarian regimes. Together, our findings suggest that the visibility of 
group differences alone does not sustain ethnic voting, which will require some organizational 
base. Compared with democracies, ethnically dominated groups are more likely to face more 
constraints in building such a base. In the context of Taiwan, the DPP’s founding as a formal 
opposition party acted as the watershed -- the DPP consolidated the anti-autocrat effect of 
Taiwanese ethnicity such that Taiwanese voters’ defection from the KMT is no longer 
constrained by its relative size in the townships. 
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Our findings have implications for other ethnically diverse electoral autocracies. For 
regimes that have also undergone democratic transitions, such as the former Soviet Union and 
Indonesia, one can study whether the same conditional pro-defection effect of shared ethnicity 
was also present. As in the case of Sub-Saharan African countries, many of which similarly 
started multiparty elections in the early 1990s, one can also examine how the dictator garners 
support. According to our theory, the relative size of the group that shares the same ethnicity 
with the dictator should not constrain his electoral support. Future research can also further 
explore pro-defection or anti-incumbent ethnic voting under different institutional settings – in 
our case, the opposition’s chance of winning the election does not directly influence the political 
salience of ethnicity, as the threshold of winning is in general low under the SNTV system. 
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1 The 28 February Incident in 1947 was the first violent confrontation between these two ethnic 
blocs (Lai, Myers and Wei, 1991). 
2 We do not expect to see that Taiwanese ethnicity can drive voter defection when the two ethnic 
blocs are about the same size in the local community since, as argued, the visibility of ethnic 
cleavages alone does not suffice to establish the political salience of ethnicity. We have also 
shown this empirically in one of our robustness tests by including a squared term of local ethnic 
demography. 
3 The KMT government held the first legislative election across the country in 1948. In total, 759 
legislators were elected to represent different constituencies in both mainland China and Taiwan. 
4 During the 1960s, Albania and other countries began to question the KMT’s presence as the 
legitimate Chinese government in the United Nations and proposed to replace it with the CCP in 
the Mainland. In 1971, the KMT government withdrew from the United Nations. Soon 
afterwards, many countries around the world, including the United States, cut their diplomatic 
ties with Chiang. 
5 The Mainlanders’ share of the population had grown from about 10% in the 1950s to about 
13% in 1990. According to the census data, the Mainlanders accounted for about 10% (1956), 




14.62% (1966), 14.57% (1980), and 13.31% (1990) of the total population in Taiwan, which 
includes Taiwan Province, Taipei Municipality and Kaohsiung Municipality, respectively. 
6 Wu (2004) and many others suggest that the KMT decided to tolerate the DPP’s presence partly 
due to pressure by the United States. 
7 In 1983, the supplementary election had six constituencies, each of which included more than 
one county in Taiwan. The 1992 election redrew the constituencies by county. 
8 One may also argue that Taipei Municipality, as the KMT’s de facto capital in Taiwan, is more 
likely to see voters conceal their true voting preferences compared with their counterparts in 
other counties. 
9 During the Japanese colonial period, those migrating or travelling from the Mainland were 
considered foreign nationals and only accounted for a very small portion of the total population 
(less than 1%) – these migrants were considered as Mainlanders after 1949 in the official 
statistics (Chen and Tuan, 1951). 
10 It is also important to point out that, with very few exceptions, the townships included in both 
surveys were mostly Hoklos, according to the Hakka Affairs Council. Excluding these Hakka 
townships does not change the results. 
11 The official records show that the candidates who contested as independents in the counties 
covered by the surveys were all Taiwanese politicians. 
12 The intermediate categories include ‘literate but uneducated’, ‘primary school’, ‘junior high 
school’, ‘senior high school’, ‘vocational college’ and ‘university and above’. We excluded 
respondents who attend military schools and colleges because we are only interested in civilians’ 
voting choices. 
13 One of the fixed effect coefficients will be the intercept, so we omit it in the table. 




14 In the main analysis, we have decided to standardize the share of the Taiwanese group to 
address the issue of collinearity. 
15 During the martial law period, local factions, which provided the foundation of the KMT’s 
clientelistic machine, engaged more in local elections than the supplementary elections at the 
national level. 
16 We also show the results based on the survey for the 1995 legislative election – the results 
remain consistent with our hypothesis. 
17 We have decided to focus on local offices at the county level because most of the DPP’s party-
building endeavours in the 1980s took place in urban areas. 
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